How Alignment Decides a DMARC Result
Picture the report: SPF says pass, DKIM says pass, and DMARC says fail anyway. That is alignment at work. DMARC wants the domain that passed SPF or DKIM to match the domain in the visible From address, either exactly (strict) or at the organizational level (relaxed). If neither passing domain lines up with the From domain, the message fails, however clean the other columns look.
Why a Pass Alone Proves Little
SPF and DKIM were designed before DMARC, and each one vouches for a domain the reader never sees. Anyone can publish an SPF record for a domain they own and send mail that passes it. Anyone can sign a message with a valid DKIM key for their own domain. So a pass tells you only that the sender controls some domain.
DMARC adds the question those checks skip: is that domain the one in the From header? RFC 9989 requires an SPF or DKIM pass and also that the domain behind the pass is aligned with the Author Domain, the one in the From header. Drop that second condition and a phisher could attach a valid signature from their own domain to a From line that reads like your company.
The Three Domains Hiding in Every Message
One email carries three domains, and they frequently differ.
The From domain is the address people see. The envelope sender, also called MAIL FROM or Return-Path, is where bounces go, and it is what SPF checks. The DKIM signing domain is the d= value inside the DKIM-Signature header, which our DKIM walkthrough covers.
If your own mail server sends for your own domain, all three usually match and you never think about alignment. Hand sending to a billing tool or a newsletter service and things change: the envelope sender is often a bounce hostname owned by the vendor, and the signature is often made with the vendor's domain. Both pass. Neither matches your From line.

Relaxed and Strict, with Sample Hostnames
Two tags in the DMARC record set the mode. adkim governs DKIM and aspf governs SPF. Each takes r for relaxed or s for strict, and each defaults to relaxed. The tags and defaults are in RFC 9989, section 4.7, and they were the same in the original RFC 7489.
Relaxed asks for the same organizational domain. Strict asks for the identical hostname. Here is how that plays out with made-up sending names.
- DKIM
d=example.com, Fromalerts@news.example.com: aligned in relaxed mode, fails in strict mode. - DKIM
d=news.example.com, Fromalerts@news.example.com: aligned in both modes. - SPF MAIL FROM
bounces.example.com, Frombilling@example.com: aligned in relaxed mode, fails in strict mode. - DKIM
d=mailvendor.net, Frombilling@example.com: not aligned in either mode, however valid the signature is.
RFC 9989 observes that nearly all domain owners have found relaxed alignment sufficient. Leave both tags out and relaxed is what you get.
Only One Aligned Pass Is Needed
DMARC does not make you align both mechanisms. A message satisfies it when at least one of SPF or DKIM passes with an aligned domain. With several DKIM signatures on one message, a single valid and aligned signature is enough, according to RFC 9989.
This is why DKIM is the sturdier half. Forward a message and SPF alignment usually breaks: the forwarding server is not in your SPF record, and the envelope sender is rewritten or fails the check. A DKIM signature on your own domain rides along with the message and still verifies, provided nobody edits the signed headers or body. Google's sender guidelines phrase the requirement the same way: the From domain must align with either the SPF domain or the DKIM domain.
What RFC 9989 Changed in May 2026
Most articles still cite RFC 7489, the 2015 specification. In May 2026 it was obsoleted by RFC 9989 and two companions, RFC 9990 for aggregate reporting and RFC 9991 for failure reporting. Alignment itself is unchanged: relaxed still means the same organizational domain, and strict still means identical.
The difference is how a receiver finds that organizational domain. RFC 7489 leaned on a public suffix list. RFC 9989 defines a DNS tree walk, in which the receiver climbs the domain name looking for DMARC records. It also removed the pct tag, which applied a policy to a percentage of failing mail, and added a t tag for testing. For most domains nothing changes in practice today, but the shift explains why older guides and newer ones disagree about a few tags (checked October 2026).
Finding and Fixing a Misaligned Sender
A handful of sources cause most alignment failures, and an aggregate report points at each one within minutes. The cure is nearly always a DNS record that makes the vendor sign or bounce under a subdomain of your own domain.
Spotting the Failure in an Aggregate Report
Each row in an aggregate report describes one sending IP address. Three parts of the row matter. The policy_evaluated element holds the DMARC verdict for DKIM and SPF. The identifiers element names the header_from domain and the envelope_from domain. The auth_results element lists the domains that actually passed, with the DKIM d= value and selector. RFC 9990 defines the element names.
Look for a row where auth_results shows a pass for a domain that is not yours while policy_evaluated shows a fail. That row is your misaligned sender. Our guide to reading a DMARC report goes through the XML in more depth.
Third-Party Senders and the Two Records They Need
Look in the sending platform's settings for a step called custom domain, domain authentication, or branded sending. It asks you to publish a few DNS records, usually CNAMEs, and they do two separate jobs. One set lets the platform sign with a DKIM key under your domain, so d= matches your From. The other points a bounce hostname such as bounces.example.com at the vendor, which puts the envelope sender on your domain and lets SPF align.
Skip the step and the platform falls back to its shared domain, which passes SPF and DKIM and aligns with nothing. Finish it and either half of DMARC can pass. If a platform offers only one of the two, insist on DKIM. Copy the hostnames exactly, too, since a DNS panel that appends your domain automatically will turn s1._domainkey.example.com into s1._domainkey.example.com.example.com. The SPF syntax guide covers the other half of this setup.
Forwarding, Mailing Lists, and Failures You Can Ignore
Some failing rows are not yours to fix. A message forwarded from an alumni address or a role alias leaves your authorized servers, so SPF fails on the next hop. A mailing list that adds a footer breaks the DKIM body hash. RFC 9989 says as much: p=reject can cause trouble for indirect mail flows, and mailing lists have mostly adopted workarounds that rewrite the From header.
So read the report with a sense of proportion. A thin trickle of failures from forwarders and lists is background noise. A steady stream from a sending service you recognize is a configuration gap.

When Strict Mode Helps and When It Bites
Strict alignment narrows the set of hostnames that can pass for your domain, which is worth having if you delegate subdomains to people you do not control. The price is that anything signing with the apex domain and sending from a subdomain, or the reverse, now fails.
Here is the classic trap. Your newsletter tool signs with d=example.com, but the From address is hello@news.example.com. Relaxed alignment lets that through. Add adkim=s and every message fails, and if the policy is already quarantine, those messages land in spam. Go strict only after a stretch of reports shows every legitimate sender signing with the exact From hostname.
Raising the Policy Without Bouncing Your Own Mail
The order matters. Publish p=none and collect reports. Fix each legitimate sender until it produces an aligned pass. Move to quarantine, read the reports again, and only then go to reject. RFC 9989 describes the t=y tag as a request that receivers treat a policy one level more gently while you test, so reject with t=y behaves like quarantine.
People skip the first step, and that is how invoices, password resets, and booking confirmations end up in spam. If that is already happening to you, begin with why emails go to spam, because alignment is only one of several causes.
Getting Alignment Sorted Out for You
With Email Authentication, we find every service that sends as your domain, sign each sender with DKIM, and publish one clean SPF record. We gather and read the DMARC reports each week and explain alignment problems in plain words, and nothing is enforced before your real mail passes. The DNS service holds the records, the transactional email service covers site-generated mail, and deliverability monitoring watches whether messages arrive. You can see how Email Authentication compares with other DMARC tools on the comparison page.
Common Questions About DMARC Alignment
Can DMARC fail when both SPF and DKIM pass?
Yes. Each can pass for a domain that differs from the From domain, and DMARC needs at least one pass on a domain that aligns with it.
Which should I fix first, SPF or DKIM alignment?
DKIM. It survives forwarding when the signed content is untouched, while SPF alignment tends to break at the first forwarding hop.
Is Relaxed Alignment Less Secure Than Strict?
Slightly looser, yes, since subdomains of your organizational domain can pass. RFC 9989 notes that nearly all domain owners find relaxed sufficient, so most never need strict.
What Are the Default Alignment Modes?
Both adkim and aspf default to relaxed when you leave them out of the record.
Why does a message from my newsletter tool fail?
Usually the tool is signing and bouncing with its own shared domain. Finish its domain authentication step so it signs under your domain.
Does a failing row in a report always mean a problem?
No. Forwarded mail and mailing lists fail for reasons outside your control. Worry about steady failures from a service you use.
Did RFC 9989 Change How Alignment Works?
The meaning of relaxed and strict stayed the same. What changed is how receivers find the organizational domain, and the removal of the pct tag.
Can I Move Straight to P=reject?
It is risky. Collect reports under p=none, fix every legitimate sender, and step through quarantine first.










